On top of the economic slowdown in 2020 caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, 2021 was the next year when the cards dealt unexpected circumstances that diverged from the previous years of stability. In Europe, we experienced an energy crisis marked by sharp spikes in gas prices and CO2 emission costs. The wartime reality of 2022 means even more uncertainty and market volatility with energy security and independence from imported raw materials becoming the most important topics. Poland continues drifting along in the modernisation of the energy sector, as clearly indicated by data collected by Forum Energii in its annual report “Energy Transition in Poland”.

On February 24, Russia started the Ukrainian war. Nothing will be the same again. Russia's brutal attack made the ongoing conflict around energy resources all the more obvious. In 2021 alone Russia could have earned PLN 500 billion (or $120 billion). from the export of energy resources. This revenue funds the Kremlin's military spending. Now we are considering whether giving up Russian fossil fuels is possible. Undoubtedly, this would be a radical solution with far-reaching and not entirely known consequences. If this were to happen, solidarity and close cooperation within the EU would be more important than ever before. In this article, we analyze what options Poland has to break its energy dependence on Russia.

A recent information campaign led by energy companies and echoed by politicians,  suggests that CO2 accounts for as much as 60% of the electricity cost. This message creates an impression that the cost of buying allowances amounts to 60 percent of the end users’ electricity bill. But this is not the case. It does a great deal of harm - it distracts attention from the fundamental problems of the Polish energy sector. It distances us from solutions that can effectively stop price increases. In this article - on the basis of adopted assumptions (presented in the annex) we present, among others, what energy prices for households are actually made of.

In recent months, rising energy prices have caused panic among policymakers. Gas and coal prices on world markets are at record highs, and crude oil is also becoming more expensive. In addition, Poland has become one of the EU countries most dependent on fossil fuel imports.

Poland has already held six power auctions. Analysis of their results shows that this mechanism in its current form is not an optimum solution for the country. The capacity market has proved more expensive than anticipated, has failed to curb the increase in electricity prices and, in addition, has contributed to the petrification of the outdated and coal-based generation structure. The arduous task of plugging the coal gap has only just begun, which is why decisions on modernisation and on methods for supporting capacity up to 2030 must be taken urgently.

The prices of coal, gas, and CO2 are reaching record levels while the price for electricity is galloping, causing panic among politicians, energy consumers, and institutions responsible for maintaining Poland’s energy security.

In recent days, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced an acceleration in the development of electromobility. By 2030, 145,000 charging points are to be built in Britain, and from 2022 all new residential and office buildings will have to be equipped with chargers. This is just one of the announcements of the global revolution in transportation. In Poland the pace and character of changes have different dimension. The National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (NFOŚiGW) has just announced a programme of subsidies for the construction of charging stations for electric and hydrogen vehicles as well as PLN 1 billion support for operators to develop distribution networks.

It’s PLN 560 billion [EUR 124 bln]. This is the amount Poland can allocate for the energy transition and phaseout of coal thanks to EU membership. This is a historic opportunity to shift the Polish economy—including the energy sector—to the low-carbon track and develop new industries. Although last year the Polish government declared the intention to pursue climate neutrality in line with EU policy, Poland’s decision-makers are anxious that the country will not be able to handle the challenge of decarbonisation. At the same time, the government’s relations with EU institutions are deteriorating, making talks about the EU funds difficult. So then, what resources are at stake?

In recent years, over 600,000 households and businesses have invested in their own solar installations, and approximately 35,000 jobs have been created in companies offering services in this segment. This is the biggest, albeit unplanned, success of the Law and Justice government in the energy sector. However, further expansion of micro-installations in Poland is questionable - the government is planning changes in the rules governing this dynamically developing energy sector. This is an operation on a living organism, therefore surgical precision is needed in introducing changes - a transparent process, clear intentions and time that will allow the newly established sector and energy companies to prepare for the transition.

Poland’s energy sector is entering a period of major turbulence. The immediate question is the continued operation of the Turów power station since the EU Court of Justice recently ordered the suspension of lignite mining there. This is just the beginning of the problems. After 2025, when public support ends, the first 8 GW of coal capacity may leave the Polish system, and a little later, another 6 GW. The power plants will be shut down due to age and costs. Observing the government’s actions, one can get the impression that all hope lies in the proposed National Agency for Energy Security . Yet, this is a side discussion because no change in ownership structure will improve the situation of the failing coal power industry. Instead, difficult decisions must be made, and the possibilities of supporting the operation of coal-fired power plants with public money are already very limited.