Poland’s energy sector looked very different just a decade ago. In 2016, coal accounted for around 80% of electricity generation, while the prospect of large-scale wind and solar development seemed unrealistic to many. Today, we are in the midst of one of the biggest structural shifts in Poland’s energy sector since the country’s post-war electrification. Coal’s share of electricity generation has fallen to 52%, while solar, wind and gas are rapidly gaining ground. In July 2026, electricity from Baltic Power – Poland’s first offshore wind farm in the Baltic Sea – entered the national grid for the first time.

What is the purpose of the European emissions trading system? Could the proposed reform benefit industry? Can Poland finally close its ETS gap? This analysis addresses these questions.     

Poland’s energy transition is clearly accelerating despite the lack of formal adoption of key government strategies, including the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). A breakthrough moment, in June last year, marked the first time that renewable energy generation exceeded coal-fired generation. Domestic production of steam coal for power generation has fallen by 47% since 2016. At the same time, renewable energy sources reached a record share of the system’s available capacity, exceeding 51%. However, the rapid changes in the sector are accompanied by continued dependence on fossil fuels, primarily oil and, increasingly, natural gas. The transition is also accelerating on the side of new technologies and adoption by energy consumers themselves. The energy storage sector is developing particularly rapidly, with the capacity of prosumer energy storage systems having reached 0.6 GW in 2025, while storage capacity of these systems doubled over the course of the year. The electric vehicle market is also growing rapidly, increasing by 68%, year on year. The course of Poland’s energy transition and its challenges are presented and analysed in the latest, ninth edition of Forum Energii’s flagship publication, Energy Transition in Poland. Yearbook 2026.

Schools, hospitals, kindergartens and administrative buildings provide essential public services. Under repeated attacks on the energy system, they also form part of Ukraine’s resilience infrastructure. Thermo-modernisation can strengthen their role in maintaining essential services while reducing energy consumption and pressure on local energy systems. Renovating the public-building stock is also becoming increasingly urgent because of Ukraine’s 2030 targets and gradual approximation to EU requirements. The scale of investment needs is also substantial: as early as 2020, the European Investment Bank estimated the minimum investment needed to renovate Ukraine’s public buildings at €2 billion.  In this context, we present the report From Funding Instruments to Delivery Capacity: Scaling Municipal Public-Building Renovation in Ukraine, which examines the available support instruments and the barriers that constrain municipalities’ ability to prepare and implement energy-renovation projects. 

Poland’s economy is one of the least electrified in the European Union and, under current government plans, it is set to remain so. The newly published Electrification Action Plan proposes an EU-wide electrification rate target of 46% by 2040. In the same period, Poland, however, assumes that its rate will reach just 26.3%. This would be the lowest level of electrification in the EU, entrenching the country’s dependence on imported fuels and energy. An accelerated pathway for electrifying industry, transport, and heating could bring Poland closer to the EU target and, above all, strengthen its resilience to external price shocks while reducing energy consumption by 15%.

International cooperation is essential for advancing the energy transition and sharing knowledge across countries. To strengthen dialogue and exchange experiences, Forum Energii and Agora Energy China are implementing a joint project: Fact-checking energy transition thinking: stories from Poland and China. Poland has valuable experience to share as coal production and consumption continue to decline. China, as the world’s largest coal consumer and a leading producer of renewable energy technologies, plays a central role in shaping the future of the global energy transition. This project is an opportunity to learn from each other, fact-check assumptions and better understand how different countries are navigating the shift from coal-based systems towards clean energy economies – and the role of just transition policies in making this shift socially and economically sustainable. 

Poland’s industrial sector, generating 21-23% of national GDP, is one of the largest manufacturing bases in the European Union. This represents a significant competitive advantage for Poland. The industrial sector is facing both a historic opportunity and a major challenge. Growing pressure from global competition, dramatic fluctuations in energy prices, and the strategic need to reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports mean that Poland needs an active industrial policy. This is the last opportunity to build competitive advantages by making the most of the current economic situation. According to the December 2025 update of the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), Poland will invest PLN 3-3.5 trillion over the coming years, primarily in clean technologies (cleantech). Demand for these solutions will grow rapidly. In response to these challenges, Forum Energii, in cooperation with the analytical centre SpotData, has published a report entitled Clean Technologies. Competitive Poland. Directions for the Development of Domestic Industry through 2030, which identifies specific solutions and analyses Poland’s potential in the area of clean technologies that could become the country’s strategic specialisations.

We are now at the midpoint of the current Multiannual Financial Framework. Looking back at the implementation to date, it is important to acknowledge that the Just Transition Mechanism, and in particular the Just Transition Fund (JTF), were new instruments that required significant institutional and administrative adjustments from all stakeholders. The regulation establishing the JTF was adopted in June 2021. The majority of the Territorial Just Transition Plans (TJTPs) had been approved by the European Commission by the end of 2022, with only the Bulgarian one completed in 2023. At this point, the programming of the JTF was effectively finished and implementation could finally commence.

Negotiations on the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034 are now underway. At the same time, Poland has initiated preparing its National and Regional Partnership Plan (NRPP), which will determine how future EU resources are programmed and distributed domestically. The stakes extend well beyond the overall size of the budget. The key question is whether, in a context of fiscal constraints and revised national programming rules, EU funds will be channelled into long-term, system-critical investments or diverted toward projects that are easier to implement or less contentious politically. Poland’s future economic growth will depend on the coherence of its investment framework and the accompanying reforms. Together, these factors will determine whether EU funding accelerates the energy transition and strengthens long-term competitiveness. Poland’s National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP)1 should serve as the primary reference point for programming. Alignment between the MFF and the NECP will be decisive in turning EU funds into an instrument of real economic transformation, rather than a mechanism for short-term spending.

Nearly a decade ago, the first work began on the concept of a capacity market in Poland. For the European Commission, it was a support mechanism for electricity producers. For the transmission system operator, it is a vital part of the energy market, providing tools to maintain required reserves and mitigate the risk of capacity shortages. Today, we can summarise the effects and the scale of the costs of the capacity market’s operation in Poland for the years 2021 to 2046—approximately PLN 200 billion. This means that the discussion on energy security cannot be limited solely to capacity itself. Security should also be understood as the ability to deliver electricity to consumers at all times and the certainty that this energy will be affordable. In view of the announcements regarding the continuation of support through the capacity market, a key question arises: is Poland achieving its goal of capacity adequacy and security of supply effectively, or rather is it entrenching a “capacity at any cost” approach?